A Critical analysis on section 8, rule 117 on the provisional dismissal in criminal cases under the revised rules of criminal procedure : understanding its nature and effects vis-a-vis the concept of due process
Before the effectivity of Section 8, Rule 117, the prevailing rule on provisional dismissal in criminal cases was open-ended. At present, specific periods have been prescribed, e.g. one (1) or two (2) years depending on the imposable penalty for the offense, within which the case should be revived; otherwise, the order of provisional dismissal shall become permanent. The new rule conveys the impression that the order of provisional dismissal becomes automatically permanent upon failure of the prosecution to revive the case within the prescribed periods. It also appears that such permanent dismissal amounts to acquittal as to bar the filling of a new information. In which event, it can unduly clip the inherent right of the State to prosecute even before the crime has prescribed. Likewise, it delimits the constitutional right of the accused sought to be enforced by the rules which are necessarily relative and flexible depending on the a) length of delay, b) reason for the delay, c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and d) prejudice caused by the delay. After a thorough analysis, it was found that statutes enacted to enforce the constitutional right of the accused to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases are either mandatory or permissive, depending on the terms used in the statutes. The subject rule on provisional dismissal in criminal cases merely refers to permanent dismissal that does not prohibit a subsequent prosecution of the accused for the same offense under a new information. The same is evident from the deliberations of the committee on revision of rules during which the phrase "amount to an acquittal" was deleted. In fact, from the use of the term "revived," the rule can only prohibit the revival of a provisionally dismissed criminal case beyond the periods prescribed but does not preclude the prosecution of the accused by the filing of a new information. This interpretation of the rule is compatible with the substantive laws on prescription and more importantly, with the inherent right of the state to prosecute bcriminal ofeenses.